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LEAGUE-LEVEL ATTENDANCE AND OUTCOME UNCERTAINTY IN U.S.
PRO SPORTS LEAGUES
BRIAN MILLS and RODNEY FORT∗
We extend the breakpoint literature regarding annual league-level attendance and
the impact of outcome uncertainty to the National Basketball Association, National
Football League, and National Hockey League. As our measures are different than past
work on baseball, we also apply our model to the American and National Leagues.
Attendance series for each league under consideration are not stationary overall,
but are stationary with break points. No form of outcome uncertainty (game, play-
off, or across seasons) matters for attendance in hockey or baseball regardless of
which game uncertainty variable is used. Under the measure of game uncertainty
that recommends itself for football, only play-off uncertainty matters for attendance.
Whether outcome uncertainty matters for basketball depends on the measure of game
uncertainty. Situational similarities in the break points across leagues suggest general
areas for future research. (JEL L83, C22)
I. INTRODUCTION
Past empirical work investigating what has
come to be called Simon Rottenberg’s (1956)
“uncertainty of outcome hypothesis” (hence-
forth, UOH) for North American professional
sports leagues has overwhelmingly involved
analysis of Major League Baseball (MLB) atten-
dance.1 What there are on attendance demand
studies of other North American sports leagues
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making their unit-root and breakpoint estimation codes
publicly available, respectively. Finally, we would like to
thank the anonymous reviewers that improved this work
immensely.
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1. Baade and Tiehen (1990); Bruggink and Eaton
(1996); Butler (2002); Coates and Harrison (2005); Cof-
fin (1996); Demmert (1973); Domazlicky and Kerr (1990);
Gitter and Rhoads (2010) (MiLB); Kahane and Shmanske
(1997); Knowles and Sherony (1992); Krautmann, Lee, and
Quinn (2011); Lee (2009); Lee and Fort (2008); Lemke,
Leonard, and Tlhokwane (2007); Meehan, Nelson, and
Richardson (2007); Noll (1974); Rascher and Solmes (2007);
Schmidt and Berri (2001, 2002, 2004); Siegfried and Eisen-
berg, (1980) (MiLB); Soebbing (2008); Tainsky and Winfree
(2010a, 2010b); Winfree et al. (2004).
have focused on fan substitution, stadium hon-
eymoon effects, discrimination, and impacts of
labor disputes.2 At best, as detailed shortly, this
literature treats the UOH inconsistently.
This paper shifts focus to the neglected
National Basketball Association (NBA), Nation-
al Football League (NFL), and National Hockey
League (NHL) with a full time series assessment
2. Coates and Humphreys (2007); Jones and Ferguson
(1988); Leadley and Zygmont (2006); Paul (2003); Paul
and Weinbach (2007); Pivovarnik et al. (2008); Schmidt and
Berri (2004); Winfree and Fort (2008).
ABBREVIATIONS
ADF: Augmented Dickey-Fuller
AL: American League
CSU: Consecutive Season Uncertainty
DFGLS: Generalized Least Squares Dickey-Fuller Test
GU: Game Uncertainty
HICB: Herfindahl Index of Competitive Balance
LAPG: Annual, League-Level, per Game Attendance
MLB: Major League Baseball
NBA: National Basketball Association
NFL: National Football League
NHL: National Hockey League
NL: National League
PP: Phillips-Perron
PU: Play-off Uncertainty
RSD: Ratio of Standard Deviations
TL: Tail Likelihood
UOH: Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis
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of the impact of outcome uncertainty on league-
level annual attendance (while maintaining
comparisons with MLB). The main contribu-
tions of the paper are two. First, unlike any
of the work just cited, we assess the impact
of all three main types of outcome uncertainty
in these three leagues, simultaneously—game
uncertainty (GU), play-off uncertainty (PU), and
consecutive season uncertainty (CSU).3 Overall,
empirical results on the influence of the UOH
have been mixed. Szymanski (2003) reviews the
findings of a number of studies and concludes
that the UOH does not have any consistent
(emphasis added) empirical backing. Borland
and MacDonald (2003) offered a more nuanced
take on the issue, surmising that a winning prob-
ability closer to 60%–70% maximized atten-
dance, rather than 50%.4 However, Fort and Lee
(2006) note that the weak and inconsistent treat-
ment of the UOH as well as complete inattention
to time series issues may be at the root of this
inconsistency in outcomes. Joining Lee and Fort
(2008) on MLB, this paper addresses this issue
by incorporating all three main types of outcome
uncertainty in a time series framework for the
rest of the North American major leagues.
Second, we investigate a variety of measures
of outcome uncertainty offered in the literature,
finding that results are a bit sensitive to the
choice of GU measures. While we choose a
particular GU measure for the sake of compar-
ison among the NBA, NFL, and NHL, we also
make clear what the differences are if other mea-
sures are used. The use of GU in previous time
series work on MLB by Lee and Fort (2008) also
informs our choice. In addition, we are able to
contrast their choice with ours concerning the
measurement of PU for MLB.
The work here, by its aggregate league-level
nature, is complementary to cross-section/time
series analysis. First, most generally, aggregate
league-level time series is only one possible
choice about the unit of observation for analyz-
ing the impact of competitive balance on atten-
dance. Thus, it will be complementary to work
at less aggregated levels of attendance. Second,
3. Rottenberg never really addressed CSU in his orig-
inal work, but we estimate its importance because it is
either assumed in some earlier work (Hadley, Cieka, and
Krautmann 2005; Humphreys 2002) or there is professional
interest in fan response to dynasties (Krautmann and Hadley
2006, and references therein).
4. More recent investigations are also mixed on the
UOH matters (Lee and Fort 2008; Meehan, Nelson, and
Richardson 2007; Rascher and Solmes 2007; Soebbing
2008).
the actual break points identified in our work
suggest additional research questions that may
best be addressed using less aggregated data, for
example, with cross-section/time series data on
attendance, perhaps even at the individual team
level.
The work here is also of aid to future
cross-section/time series endeavors. Nonstation-
ary data can adversely affect coefficient standard
error estimates and produce spurious correla-
tions (Davies, Downward, and Jackson 1995;
Dobson and Goddard 2001). As also detailed in
Davis (2008), ascertaining that regression anal-
yses are performed on stationary subsets of data
ensures that valid inferences can be made from
regression coefficients. Our work identifies sta-
tionary subsets of the data to help overcome
this problem. While a first-differences treatment
of nonstationary time series does not allow the
calculation of direct elasticity estimates for vari-
ables within a regression, our work allows esti-
mation without first differences, and elasticity
interpretations are appropriate.
By way of preview, the attendance data in
all three leagues are nonstationary, but station-
ary with break points. Also, we find very limited
support for the UOH and, upon reflection on
the choice of measures for GU, suggest that the
previous Lee and Fort (2008) finding that PU
matters for MLB is sensitive to the choice of
measurement. By our measures, for the NHL,
and for the National League (NL) and American
League (AL) in MLB, the UOH is rejected for
all three types of outcome uncertainty regardless
of which measure is used for GU. A particu-
lar measure of GU recommends itself for the
NFL with the result that the UOH matters for
PU in that league. Whether GU matters or not
for the NBA is a matter of which GU variable
is used. However, while outcome uncertainty
measures do produce some statistically signifi-
cant results for Rottenberg’s UOH for the NBA
and the NFL, the economic impacts are triv-
ial for league revenues. Finally, there are sit-
uational similarities among some of the break
points across the different leagues, suggesting
that further analysis of the impacts of global
conflict, league expansion, league responses to
rival leagues (e.g., mergers), and fan substitu-
tion among pro-sports leagues during strikes and
lockouts will prove insightful.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section II,
we present data collection methods, our selec-
tion of measures for the three types of outcome
uncertainty, data issues, and our methodology.
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Section III presents our results organized around
the four main points of analysis—unit-root tests
of stationarity for each league (including unit
root with break points), variable selection for
GU, the break points for each league, and the
results for outcome uncertainty on attendance.
A comparison of situational similarities asso-
ciated with break points across the leagues as
a guide to future general research areas is in
Section IV. Finally, in Section V, we con-
clude with remaining suggestions for future
research.
II. DATA, MEASUREMENT, AND METHODOLOGY
A. Data
Our data come from Rod’s Sports Busi-
ness Data (2012a, 2012b, 2012c) and the
Sports Reference league-specific coverage web-
sites (Basketball-Reference 2012; Hockey-
Reference 2012; Pro-Football-Reference 2012).5
As in all of the past works on aggregate league
attendance already cited, we specify attendance
as annual, league-level, per-game attendance
(LAPG) because the number of games and teams
has changed substantially throughout the his-
tory of each respective league. LAPG is calcu-
lated by dividing annual total league attendance
by the total number of games played for each
year within the series. The length of LAPG
series in each league is subject to the availability
of attendance data—NBA: 1955–1956 through
2009–2010; NFL: 1934 through 2009; NHL:
1960–1961 through 2009–2010. We stress that
we do not formally analyze demand, as the
models do not account for sellouts, especially
apparent for the NFL. In addition, many of the
usual variables of interest in demand analysis
are subsumed in trend variables due to lack
of data. Cross-section/time series approaches
where more data are available will prove
enlightening.
B. Measurement
We investigated various measures of outcome
uncertainty already available in the literature in
order to preserve some comparability for our
5. There is some disagreement of available data sources
for NHL attendance in certain years. For that league only, we
average three sources of game attendance for years in which
multiple estimates are available—Rod’s Sports Business
Data (2012), Hockey Zone Plus (2010), and Andrew’s Dallas
Stars Page (2010).
eventual estimation results.6 The variables, their
definitions, and their descriptive statistics are
in Table 1.7 Published measures of GU capture
two possible dimensions of fan preference, the
overall distribution of winning percentage out-
comes and just the tails of that distribution. The
Ratio of Standard Deviations (RSD; Fort and
Quirk 1995; Noll 1988; Scully 1989) and expo-
sition of the Herfindahl Index of Competitive
Balance (HICB) by Lenten (2009) both mea-
sure the breadth of the entire distribution of
winning percentages. The Tail Likelihood mea-
sure (TL, Fort and Quirk 1995) used in Lee and
Fort (2008) examines both tails of the distri-
bution of winning percentages. Since there is
no overwhelming evidence that either of these
dimensions is more important to fans of any par-
ticular league, we investigate all of these GU
measures further, in the results section.8
For PU and CSU, we were able to com-
pare the published options and choose based on
how measurements adhere to the relevant task.
For PU, we are convinced that the PLU mea-
sure from Krautmann, Lee, and Quinn (2011)
is superior due to its robustness with respect to
the distribution of play-off contending teams.9
PLU contains information about the entire dis-
tribution of team distance from first place while
the other published measure (Lee and Fort 2008)
contained only information about the first and
second place finish.
There also are two extant measures for CSU,
the correlation in team performance across sea-
sons (CORR) in Lee and Fort (2008), based
on the measure in Butler (1995), and Lenten’s
(2009) “mobility gain function.” We believe that
CORR is defensible by its “longer memory”
with three prior seasons compared with Lenten’s
6. We thank an anonymous referee and the editor for
instructing us to undertake the investigation of different
measures of outcome uncertainty. Our original choice was to
use the same measures as in Lee and Fort (2008) in order to
maintain comparability to that earlier work. However, as the
referee put it, without an investigation of different measures,
any statement about the UOH and attendance may have more
to say about the measures chosen than about Rottenberg’s
idea.
7. Decade averages are used for exposition in Table 1.
For the NBA, the 1950s LAPG average uses only data
from 1955–1956 through the 1959–1960 seasons, because
of availability. However, all uncertainty measures use all
seasons in each decade included in the table.
8. The NHL uses a point system rather than simple
winning percentages. We convert the NHL to winning
percentage, recognizing that for our purposes the damage
is light. On this issue, see Fort (2007) and Owen (2012).
9. We thank the anonymous referee who first pointed
out this important distinction.
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TABLE 1
LAPG, Outcome Uncertainty Measures, and Decade Averages
NBA LAPG GU PU CSU AL LAPG GU PU CSU
1950s 4,778 0.241 0.060 0.410 1900s 4,809 0.038 0.020 0.499
1960s 5,714 0.022 0.052 0.558 1910s 4,997 0.045 0.015 0.458
1970s 9,644 0.201 0.047 0.285 1920s 7,796 0.064 0.015 0.628
1980s 12,110 0.052 0.052 0.654 1930s 6,445 0.018 0.011 0.747
1990s 15,836 0.044 0.047 0.605 1940s 11,235 0.103 0.017 0.616
2000s 17,204 0.105 0.046 0.488 1950s 13,360 0.055 0.015 0.742
Avg. 11,436 0.112 0.050 0.501 1960s 12,606 0.166 0.014 0.638
1970s 14,824 0.267 0.021 0.558
NFL LAPG GU PU CSU 1980s 22,100 0.364 0.024 0.433
1930s 18,205 0.189 0.046 0.647 1990s 27,906 0.395 0.026 0.337
1940s 26,521 0.167 0.043 0.483 2000s 29,160 0.167 0.029 0.560
1950s 31,211 0.495 0.048 0.382 Avg. 14,198 0.154 0.019 0.568
1960s 44,349 0.470 0.046 0.428
1970s 54,326 0.862 0.051 0.518 NL LAPG GU PU CSU
1980s 54,048 1.363 0.059 0.357 1900s 4,366 0.006 0.012 0.690
1990s 57,732 1.041 0.061 0.354 1910s 4,203 0.101 0.012 0.396
2000s 64,478 0.998 0.059 0.345 1920s 7,248 0.090 0.020 0.690
Avg. 47,432 0.725 0.052 0.428 1930s 6,686 0.072 0.020 0.685
1940s 10,478 0.047 0.015 0.631
NHL LAPG GU PU CSU 1950s 13,348 0.146 0.017 0.693
1960s 12,658 0.174 0.051 0.527 1960s 15,578 0.148 0.019 0.494
1970s 12,837 0.081 0.050 0.762 1970s 18,215 0.294 0.022 0.603
1980s 13,842 0.521 0.058 0.631 1980s 23,191 0.393 0.024 0.298
1990s 15,539 0.647 0.057 0.483 1990s 28,016 0.339 0.026 0.178
2000s 16,879 0.660 0.051 0.457 2000s 31,304 0.543 0.031 0.429
Avg. 14,351 0.417 0.053 0.572 Avg. 14,881 0.200 0.020 0.520
LAPG: League annual average attendance per game.
GU: We compared three measures but “tail likelihood” (TLt ) became the main focus (it is the only GU variable covered in
this table). TLt is the excess of observed tail frequencies of high or low winning percentages over “idealized” frequencies that
would occur if all teams were of equal playing strength (supposing the probability that any team will defeat any other equals
0.5). If TLt increases, the tails of the distribution are moving closer to the league average winning percentage, that is, outcome
uncertainty increases. We also examined the ratio of standard deviations. Let ASDt be the actual standard deviation of winning
percentages for a league in a given year. Let ISDt be the standard deviation of an “idealized” league where the probability
that any team beats any other team is 0.5, namely for the binomial, 0.5√
m
, where m is season length. The ratio of standard
deviations is RSDt = ASDtISDt . As RSDt increases, outcome uncertainty declines. We also examined HICBt =
4
Nt
∑Nt
i=1
(wi
r
)2
t
,
where Nt is the number of teams in the league in year t , wi is wins by team i, and r is the total number of games in the
season in year t . Outcome uncertainty declines with higher values of HICBt .
PU: We use a variant of the measure cited in the text since we can only evaluate at season’s end for our annual league-level
aggregate of attendance. The measure is given by, PLUt = 1N
∑N
i=1 f (GBi,t
max(G)
Gt
). N is the number of teams other than
division winners in a league, f is n ∼(0,6), and max(G) is the maximum number of games played over the sample period
for the league. For GBi , let GBid be the number of games back for a team that is i wins behind the division winner and
let GBiw be the number of games back for a team that is i wins behind the wild-card winner. GBi = min(GBid , GBiw). As
PLUt increases, outcome uncertainty declines.
CSU: CORRt is the correlation across teams between WPi,t , winning percentage for team i, year t , and 13
∑t−1
s=t−3 WPi,s .
Outcome uncertainty declines as CORRt increases.
measure that only uses one prior season. It is
more reasonable to think of CSU across more
than one season of reference.10
We found that there is the high correlation
in all leagues within the three GU measures
10. For our aim—specifying separately GU, PU, and
CSU—we passed on Humphreys’ (2002) competitive bal-
ance ratio and Lenten’s (2009) top team concentration index
because each is a hybrid of types of balance and has the
chance to confuse GU and PU. We also could not determine
how to calculate Owen’s (2010) higher moments (range and
listed above, except in the NHL. The corre-
lations between RSD and HICB are between
.856 and .980. However, there are only a few
signs of mild to strong correlation between these
GU measures and PLU (our chosen measure
of PU) and CORR (our chosen measure of
CSU).
variance) of the ratio of standard deviations measure for the
unbalanced schedules and larger leagues/divisions of up to
15 teams in our data.
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C. Data Issues and Adjusted Series
There are a number of issues with raw atten-
dance data.11 Each league has had either a
strike (players refuse to work) or lockout (own-
ers refuse to run part or all of a season) at
some point. While previous literature has made
use of indicator variables to denote strike and
lockout years (Schmidt and Berri 2002, 2004;
Coates and Harrison 2005), this can adversely
affect detection of long-term structural change
elsewhere in the data where the series may be
partitioned into short subsamples by the indica-
tor variables. Therefore, in addition to the raw
LAPG, we make use of an adjusted version
to handle labor disputes that actually resulted
in lost games for fans. For those years, the
adjustment takes a weighted average LAPG of
the seasons just before games were lost, dur-
ing the season where games were lost, and just
following the year where games were lost, as
in Lee and Fort (2008). In the case of the
2004–2005 NHL season lost in its entirety, we
average data from one season before and after
the work stoppage. This adjustment ensures that
later breakpoint size and location estimation is
not falsely influenced by the short-term shocks
that may result from a work stoppage, as the
works just cited find short-term effects of strikes,
rather than long-term. Lastly, we assume the
average of reported games was the same over
all games for a few NFL teams that did not
report the attendance at all of their games for
2008 and 2009.12
D. Methodology
We follow the approach outlined in Fort
and Lee (2006) as actually implemented by
Lee and Fort (2008). The first step is to test
each attendance series against the null of a unit
root. Then, if needed, stationarity with break
points is assessed. Third, using what is now
referred to as the “BP method” (Bai and Perron
1998, 2003, 2006), the statistical significance
11. For example, while LAPG for early NHL games
was nearing 15,000, league expansion reportedly decreased
LAPG by 3,500. While the Oakland Seals saw LAPG in this
range (Kurtzberg 2009), it seems unlikely that Los Angeles,
Minnesota, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis did. After
this short initial period of low reported attendance, reports
rebounded (just before the formation of the WHA in 1972).
We return to this issue later.
12. The 2008 San Francisco 49ers and 2009 Tampa Bay
Buccaneers reported attendance for only seven games, as
they played one of their home games in London, United
Kingdom, leaving this number out of their reports.
and qualitative characteristics of the break point
is determined. Finally, the impact of our UOH
measures on attendance is estimated, taking into
account break points in the data.
The unit-root hypothesis was tested using the
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-
Perron (PP) tests with both a constant and with
a trend. The numbers of lags were determined
by minimization of the Schwartz–Bayesian cri-
terion for the ADF test, and by the truncation
suggested by Newey and West (1994) for the PP
test. Unit-root tests were further verified using
the generalized least squares Dickey–Fuller test
(DFGLS) as described in Elliot, Rothenberg, and
Stock (1996).
Leybourne, Mills, and Newbold (1998) high-
light the possibility of spurious rejections of
unit-root presence with Dickey–Fuller tests
when breaks are near the beginning of a non-
stationary series. We therefore employ the two-
break minimum LM unit-root test irrespective of
the results from the ADF and PP tests (Lee and
Strazicich 2001, 2003, 2004; Perron 1989). Fol-
lowing results from this procedure, we employ a
one-break minimum LM unit-root test (Lee and
Strazicich 2001) for series that are not rejected
at the highest level with the two-break test.
Lastly, we further verify the unit root with break
results using the Zivot–Andrews test (Zivot and
Andrews 1992).13
For each league attendance series in which
a unit root is rejected, or rejected with break
points, we apply the approach of Bai and
Perron (1998, 2003, 2006) to ascertain the
statistical significance and qualitative behavior
of the breaks allowing changes in both levels
and trends as first described in Perron (1989).
Our model for each league parallels that used
on MLB in Lee and Fort (2008) and we do
not reprise it here. Suffice to say that we
perform the BP method on each league as
a separate regression, including the impacts
of our UOH variables where only coefficients
on the time trend and level are allowed to
change across regimes, while the coefficients
pertaining to UOH variables are not. This is
classified as the partial model in Bai and Perron
(2003).
We present model results that assume homo-
geneous error estimates across regimes for the
statistical tests with the suggested trimming
13. For brevity, we do not report the results of the
DFGLS or Zivot–Andrews test here; however, the results
of these are available upon request.
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TABLE 2
Results of Unit-Root Tests
League NBA NFL NHL
T (seasons) 55 76 50
ADF (p) Constant −0.883 (1) −2.017 (1) −1.210 (1)
ADF (p) Trend −1.287 (1) −2.233 (1) −2.682 (1)
PP (l) Constant −0.965 (3) −1.774 (3) −1.399 (3)
PP (l) Trend −1.406 (3) −1.905 (3) −2.987 (3)
2-Break LM
ˆk 7 3 6
ˆTb1 1972/1973 1972 1973/1974
ˆTb2 1996/1997 2000 1985/1986
Test Stat. −5.714** −6.076** −6.323**
1-Break LM
ˆk 7 8 3
¯Tb 1992/1993 1980 1976/1977
Test Stat. −5.182*** −3.431 −4.580**
p, the number of lags; l, lag truncation; ˆk is the optimal number of lagged first-difference terms included in the unit-root
test to correct for serial correlation. ˆTb denotes the estimated break points. See Table 2 of Lee and Strazicich (2003) for
critical values. ***, **, * = significant at 99%, 95%, and 90% critical levels, respectively. See Lee and Fort (2008) for unit
roots of MLB American and National Leagues.
parameter (ε = 0.15).14 While we also exam-
ined results assuming heterogeneous error esti-
mates across regimes with a larger trimming
parameter, the only differences produced by the
two models occurred in the NHL and we detail
later why we believe the homogeneous version
is more useful. We use current year measures
of balance, rather than lagged versions since it
seems reasonable that outcome uncertainty in
the current year would be more desirable to fans
than the previous year. Finally, we report the
results of the BP method on the attendance data
adjusted for labor issues (results for unadjusted
data are available upon request).
III. RESULTS OF ANALYSIS
As detailed in all of the above, the results
of our analysis should inform us on four main
points—stationarity characteristics of the data
(roughly identifying breaks in the attendance
time series), sorting out the issue of the mea-
surement of GU over the entire distribution of
winning or just in the tails, the determination of
the significance of the break points (we add a
brief look at the economic as well as statistical
significance) in the attendance time series for
each league. Finally, and the punch line, is the
14. Bai and Perron (2006) discuss the size and power
properties of the structural break tests under certain
conditions.
impact of the UOH on attendance through GU,
PU, and CSU.
A. Stationarity
Unit-root test results are in Table 2. For
all three leagues, we fail to reject the pres-
ence of a unit root in the data using the Aug-
mented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests.
We follow with Lagrange Multiplier tests for
stationarity with break points from Lee and
Strazicich (2001, 2004). The two-break test
rejects the presence of a unit root at the 95%
critical level for all three leagues.
If the attendance series are stationary with
only a single break, the power of the two-break
test may be reduced. Therefore, we also apply
the one-break test for all leagues, as none of the
attendance series were rejected at the highest
critical level (99%). The one-break test rejects
the presence of a unit root with breaks at the
99% critical level for the NBA but not for the
NFL. We proceed under the assumption that all
attendance series are stationary with one or two
breaks.
B. Sorting Out GU
In order to investigate how GU might enter
into the determination of attendance, we inves-
tigated break points using each of RSD, HICB,
and TL in combination with PLU and CORR
(results available upon request). We compared
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TABLE 3
Bai and Perron Model 1 Break Test Results
League T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
NBA 1987–1988 1997–1998
[1986–1987, 1988–1989] [1996–1997, 2000–2001]
NFL 1973 1997
[1972, 1974] [1996, 2000]
NHL 1966–1967 1975–1976 1994–1995
[1965–1966, 1967–1968] [1974–1975, 1976–1977] [1993–1994, 1995–1996]
AL 1918 1945 1963 1978 1994
[1917, 1919] [1944, 1946] [1962, 1964] [1977, 1981] [1993, 1996]
NL 1918 1945 1976
[1917, 1919] [1944, 1946] [1975, 1979]
Notes: 90% confidence intervals are in []. Lee and Fort (2008) break points were as follows:
AL: 1918, 1945, 1962, 1987; NL: 1918, 1945, 1967.
the UOH results for each combination and the
outcome was completely consistent for the NHL,
AL, and NL—the UOH for all three types of
outcome uncertainty was rejected regardless of
which GU measure was used. However, for the
NBA and NFL, the UOH results depended on
whether TL or HICB was used to measure GU
(but not RSD, so it was dropped from further
consideration).
We chose TL for the NFL since the adjusted
R2 value was about the same as for HICB but
HICB identified one more break than did TL.15
To us, this suggests that the TL measure cap-
tured something that HICB simply left unex-
plained in the added break point. Further, since
UOH results were the same in the NHL, AL,
and NL for any of the GU measures, we also
use TL for hockey and baseball. However, none
of these criteria distinguished TL from HICB for
the NBA; both gave the same break points (by
overlapping confidence intervals) and about the
same adjusted R2. For the sake of comparison,
we report results consistently across all leagues
using TL but point out the differences that occur
when HICB is used instead for the NBA.
C. The BP Method and Break Points in
Attendance
The BP test results are in Table 3. Since we
employ a different measure for PU than Fort
15. The caution we followed is that one cannot choose
just on goodness of fit unless the same break points
are identified by covariates under comparison because of
how our chosen breakpoint method works—breakpoint
determination goes along with the choice of variables so
adjusted R2 might go up just because another break point is
identified, not because the covariates got any stronger.
and Lee (2008), we also include the results
of our model for the AL and NL. The break
points we find for the AL and NL are quite
different beyond the earliest in 1918 and 1945
in both leagues and then 1962 in the AL. We
note that very little information can be gleaned
from the upcoming discussion of coefficient
estimates for level shifts in the model. For this
reason, we plot the fitted value of adjusted
attendance for all leagues in Figures 1 and 2.
We offer the example of the results for the
NBA and leave the results for the other leagues
to the reader (more substantive coverage is in
the following section on situational similarities).
Figure 1 shows that the 1987–1988 break point
for the NBA dramatically shifted attendance
upward. An upward trend followed at about the
same rate as the upward trend that characterized
NBA attendance prior to the first break. The
1997–1998 break point shows only the slightest
decline in attendance followed by a barely
perceptible upward trend.
D. Attendance and Outcome Uncertainty:
Statistical and Economic Significance
Table 4 shows the attendance estimation
results. Table 5 summarizes the implications of
our estimation for the UOH for all leagues. We
also include the results for MLB from Lee and
Fort (2008) on MLB. We note immediately that
we do not find the same support for the UOH
regarding PU that they found earlier. Partly,
their analysis was on a shorter sample but the
primary difference is that the measure of PU we
use, PLU, incorporates the entire distribution of
play-off contending teams rather than just those
in first and second place.
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FIGURE 1
Plot of Fitted NBA, NFL, and NHL LAPG
FIGURE 2
Plot of Fitted AL and NL (MLB) LAPG
The first striking result to us in Table 5 is that
there is extremely limited evidence supporting
Rottenberg’s UOH. GU for the NBA impacts
attendance in accord with the UOH. As TL rises,
and GU improves, attendance increases. If the
NBA owners care about balance because fans
do, then they are better off facilitating closely
contested individual games. But we hasten to
add that if one uses HICB rather than TL for
the NBA, it would be CSU rather than GU that
would have a statistically significant impact and
fail to reject the UOH (break points remain the
same plus or minus their confidence intervals).
This suggests to us that further empirical work
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TABLE 4
Breakpoint Regression Results
League α1 β1 α2 β2 α3 β3 α4 β4 α5 β5 α6 β6
NBA 281 3,927 312 4,977 71 14,277
t-value (29.18)∗∗∗ (5.42)∗∗∗ (6.76)∗∗∗ (2.55)∗∗ (1.72)∗ (6.73)∗∗∗
NFL 1,107 6,662 286 32,474 448 25,602
t-value (39.60)∗∗∗ (2.24)∗∗ (4.83)∗∗∗ (8.94)∗∗∗ (2.79)∗∗∗ (2.16)∗∗
NHL 587 9,787 103 11,344 224 7,226 107 11,442
t-value (7.85)∗∗∗ (9.68)∗∗∗ (1.70)∗ (10.67)∗∗∗ (10.71)∗∗∗ (5.89)∗∗∗ (4.28)∗∗∗ (7.28)∗∗∗
AL −69 5,641 −5 7,546 −194 24,671 324 −9,453 705 −37,388 222 5,685
t-value (−1.04) (5.77)∗∗∗ (−0.19) (7.41)∗∗∗ (−3.74)∗∗∗ (8.67)∗∗∗ (4.89)∗∗∗ (−2.02)∗∗ (11.01)∗∗∗ (−6.71)∗∗∗ (3.33)∗∗∗ (0.84)
NL −104 5,085 22 5,583 127 6,756 397 −11,080
t-value (−1.20) (4.60)∗∗∗ (0.64) (4.45)∗∗∗ (4.40)∗∗∗ (3.77)∗∗∗ (14.62)∗∗∗ (−4.61)∗∗∗
League γTL (GU) γPLU (PU) γCorr3 (CSU) ¯R2(R2)
NBA 1,619 −9,696 −708 0.990
t-value (2.75)∗∗∗ (−0.72) (−1.95)∗ (0.992)
NFL 101 157,186 −260 0.986
t-value (0.11) (2.46)∗∗ (−0.25) (0.988)
NHL 244 −302 921 0.954
t-value (0.95) (−0.02) (2..83)∗∗∗ (0.964)
AL −516 31,852 −836 0.984
t-value (−0.59) (1.64) (−1.45) (0.986)
NL −338 44,961 −200 0.977
t-value (−0.40) (1.93)∗ (−0.39) (0.979)
∗∗∗Significant at the 99% critical level.∗∗Significant at the 95% critical level.∗Significant at the 90% critical level.
αM and βM refer to the slope and intercept coefficients for regime M , respectively.
TABLE 5
UOH Summary
League GU PU CSU
NBA Fail to rejecta Rejectb Reject
NFL Reject Fail to reject Reject
NHL Reject Reject Reject (–)c
MLBd Reject Reject Reject
a
“Fail to reject”: Estimated coefficient yields statistically
significantly positive relationship between the given measure
of outcome uncertainty and attendance.
b
“Reject”: Estimated coefficient yields statistically
insignificant relationship between the given measure of out-
come uncertainty and attendance.
c
“Reject (–)”: Estimated coefficient yields statistically
significantly negative relationship between the given mea-
sure of outcome uncertainty and attendance.
dLee and Fort (2008) found the following: GU = Reject,
PU = Fail to reject, CSU = Reject.
on the actual preferences of NBA fans toward
GU is in order—in other types of fan preference
models, are they more in tune with the tails or
the overall distribution of winning percentages?
The only other piece of evidence supporting
Rottenberg’s UOH is for PU in the NFL. If NFL
owners care about balance because fans do, they
should facilitate tight division championship
races.
Now, as we have repeatedly stated, Rotten-
berg never directly addressed the question of
CSU; that is, dynasties. The results in Table 5
show overwhelmingly that any version of the
UOH extended to dynasties is simply rejected
(unless NBA fans adhere to HICB rather than
PL for GU, in which case the evidence supports
the UOH for CSU in the NBA). In addition,
judging by the significantly negative response
of attendance to an improvement in CSU, NHL
fans appear to like dynasties. However, we cau-
tion that the result for the NHL may be due to
the inability of the BP method to handle two
closely adjacent break points. In 1967–1968,
the NHL doubled in size from 6 to 12 teams.
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This expansion had an effect on the competi-
tive balance of the league, especially for CSU
measured by CORR. The CORR measure dur-
ing the first 3 years of expansion includes six
NHL teams in its calculation, as the expansion
teams do not have 3 years’ worth of win data
to include in the measure. This calculation issue
made the CSU variable drop considerably for
these 3 years only, returning to previous levels
once all teams have available data to include in
the calculation. Given that the first NHL break
is not as large as the entire attendance dip during
this short period, the approach may be attribut-
ing much of the decrease in attendance to the
improvement in CSU.
This lack of any support at all for the UOH in
the NHL and the two MLB leagues makes them
much like the European leagues as assessed
by Szymanski (2003). However, at least at the
annual league level, there appears to be variation
in the importance of outcome uncertainty and
the type of outcome uncertainty that matters
for attendance in the NBA and the NFL. This
suggests that there are truly interesting and
insightful differences to be discovered among
fans of the major North American sports leagues
in future work on data at a less aggregate
level. However, we repeat the caution that
researchers using those data mind the break
points determined in the last section.
Statistical significance does not guarantee
economic significance. Therefore, we take the
Lee and Fort (2008) approach that incrementally
changes balance measures to produce attendance
increases to estimate the effects this would
have on stadium revenues. The data are from
Team Marketing Report for 2009 found at Rod’s
Sports Business Data (2012a, 2012b, 2012c).
For example, for GU, statistically significant
for the NBA, we improve GU by the average
change in the TL measure from year to year.
We do similarly for an improvement in PU for
the NFL and a worsening in CSU for the NHL.
We then determine the change in attendance that
results and apply the correctly normalized dollar
values from the Team Marketing Report, Fan
Cost Index data for 2009. The results are in
Table 5.
If the NBA were able to take actions in our
chosen incremental fashion, the league would
enjoy a 0.60% increase in revenues for improved
GU. While statistically significant, this result
indicates that the economic significance of out-
come uncertainty to the NBA is minimal, about
$7,300 per game or about $300,000 for 41 home
TABLE 6
Economic Significance of Outcome Uncertainty
(Statistically Significant Coefficients Only)
NBA NFL NHL
Value calculation GU PU CSU
2009 LAPG 17,132 67,426 17,476
2009 Variable 0.030 0.058 0.378
Coef. est.a 1,619 157,186 921
Elasticity 0.0028 0.1352 0.0199
Variableb 0.064 0.004 0.184
Inc. Factor 213.3% 6.9% 48.7%
LAPG 102.3 629.0 169.4
% LAPG 0.60% 0.93% 0.97%
Rev. Per Attendc $71.93 $103.16 $75.14
Game Rev. $7,358 $64,887 $12,729
aCoefficient taken from Model 1 and follows the
approach of Lee and Fort (2008, 291).
bAll measures interpreted by definition, not coefficient
sign in the model.
cRevenue per attendee data come from Team Marketing
Report, Fan Cost Index data, 2009.
games for a team.16 This would seem to require
extreme micro-level management for a less than
1% increase in total league revenues.
Using a similar approach to PU in the NFL,
the revenues gained are again minimal for the
league, an increase of only 0.93%. This amounts
to about $65,000 in game revenues, or about
$520,000 for eight home games in the regular
season for each team. This total for the entire
league equates to the salary of one 3-year vet-
eran player contracted at the league minimum.
Exactly the same approach and logic also
reveals that the statistical significance of CSU
for the NHL ends up truly trivial, economically.
If the NHL were able to take action that reduced
CSU in the incremental fashion we devise, the
result would be about a 0.97% increase in
league revenues translating into approximately
$520,000 per team for 41 home games.
IV. SITUATIONAL SIMILARITIES AND FURTHER
RESEARCH
A few situational similarities across leagues
suggest interesting general topics for further
research. The first concerns truly macro events.
The earliest break points are only found for
baseball and have been attributed elsewhere to
16. We note that the year-to-year change in GU is
rather large, highlighting the particularly economically triv-
ial impact of micromanaging GU in the NBA.
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the two world wars (Fort and Lee, forthcoming).
The NFL (founded 1920) came after World War
I and was fully functioning at World War II.
One interesting area for future research might
be why World War II impacted baseball but not
hockey or football (at least as far as attendance
shifts go).17
The next situational similarity is league
expansion. The break points in the 1960s coin-
cided with expansion in both the AL in baseball
and the NHL; the shifts were both downward.
The only break point in the 1980s coincided
with expansion in the NBA and the shift was
in the opposite direction. It is easy to see why
there was this difference between baseball and
hockey, on the one hand, and basketball on
the other. AL expansion followed the move of
the Washington Senators to Minnesota (Twins);
expansion teams were placed in Washington, DC
(Senators II) and Los Angeles (Angels). Neither
the moves nor the expansion involved espe-
cially talented teams and none drew very well.
The NHL added Philadelphia, Los Angeles, St.
Louis, Minnesota, Pittsburgh, and Oakland to
become a 12-team league in 1967–1968. The
downward shift could easily be a combination
of the complete segregation of all expansion
teams into the West Division with all original
eight teams into the East Division, and poor
attendance in these new markets (especially true
of Oakland).18 In the NBA, it is reasonable
that attendance would shift upward instead. The
Charlotte Hornets and Miami Heat joined for the
1988–1989 season and the Orlando Magic and
Minnesota Timberwolves joined the very next
season, 1989–1990. The Florida markets were
large and attendance was high.19 Additionally,
17. The question does not extend to the NBA (founded
1946–1947) since it was founded during World War II and
we do not know whether the NHL (founded 1917–1918)
would be included in the question because our data do not
go that far back.
18. The subsequent upward trend in hockey attendance
coincides with further expansion to Buffalo and Vancouver
for the 1970–1971 season. The two outdrew some of the
most prominent teams in the league like the Detroit Red
Wings and Boston Bruins after only 2 years in the league.
19. There are two complicating factors for the NBA. The
first is related to the move of some teams to new arenas. Sec-
ond, Magic Johnson and his L.A. Lakers teammate Kareem
Abdul Jabbar would retire shortly after the 1987–1988 break
point and the Celtics’ Larry Bird just after them, ending a
long-running charismatic NBA episode. While entering the
league for the 1984–1985 season, the Bulls’ Jordan matured
as the previous era ended. As rosters are so much smaller
than in any other sport, charismatic (as well as proficient)
stars may have larger individual impacts than in any other
sport.
Detroit, Milwaukee, and Sacramento moved to
new arenas, nearly doubling the seating capacity
for these teams. Of course, this begs the research
question on just why leagues took such different
expansion approaches and why other expansions
do not coincide with any break points at all (e.g.,
the NL for the 1993 season).
A third situational similarity coinciding with
the break points in the 1970s is league merger.
The NFL merger (1970) occurred just prior to an
attempted rival league, the WFL (1974–1975).
The NHL, on the other hand, faced a truly
viable rival league, the WHA (1972–1973 to
1978–1979). The Edmonton Oilers, New Eng-
land Whalers, Quebec Nordiques, and Winnipeg
Jets merged into the NHL and that was that for
the WHA. The similarity here suggests fruitful
research on the choices made by owners through
their leagues in the face of potential and actual
rival leagues.
The final situational similarity is strikes and
lockouts that actually denied fans portions of
regular season games and in some cases play-
offs and championships. The break points in
the 1990s coincide with the 1994–1995 MLB
strike (lost portion of the 1994 regular season,
play-offs and World Series, and a portion of
the 1995 season) for the AL,20 the 1994–1995
lockout in the NHL (reduced the regular season
from 82 to 48 games),21 and the 1998–1999
NBA lockout (reduced the regular season from
82 to 50 games). For baseball, attendance shifts
down and the trends are flatter than before the
shift. This seems entirely consistent with fans
that are put off by the strike and dampen their
attendance after it ends. Despite adjusting our
LAPG for just such an occurrence, there are
perhaps more lasting impressions from a strike
in MLB than could be found in previous work
on the subject (Schmidt and Berri 2002, 2004;
Coates and Harrison 2005). For the rest, the
timing of the break points suggests a complex
20. One explanation for the lack of a similar break point
in the NL is that NL expansion occurred with Florida (the
Marlins) and Colorado (the Rockies) beginning play in 1993.
The Rockies topped the attendance chart in both leagues
while the Marlins were a respectable 5th in the NL.
21. Due to the constraints on estimating breaks near
endpoints, the BP method is unable to detect anything about
the NHL lockout in 2004–2005. Visual inspection does not
raise any concern about changes due to the lockout, and it
could be that rule changes adopted after the lockout, added
enough excitement to the game as to counteract any backlash
that may have occurred. We suspect, instead, that it is worth
returning to the question after a few years more of data are
generated.
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substitution process that may have been missed
in previous work and goes as follows.
First, there is a rather large upward move-
ment in attendance that coincides with the
NHL break possibly indicating fans from MLB
(specifically the AL based on the break dates)
began attending NHL games due to the absence
of baseball. Second, the lower end of the
confidence interval on the NBA break point
(1996–1997) suggests that NBA attendance
demand may have reached its peak or that
reported attendance was at or near capacity just
following the labor issues that plagued both
the NHL and MLB in 1994 and 1995. Perhaps
the upward movement in NBA attendance fol-
lowed fan substitution from these two sports to
the NBA and abruptly ended as these leagues
returned to play. Finally, while there was no
strike or lockout in the NFL at its break point
(well after the 1993–1994 strike),22 the league
may well have enjoyed an attendance bump
coincident with the decline that occurred in the
NBA. Previous work has found little evidence of
hockey-to-basketball substitution (Winfree and
Fort 2008) but perhaps the substitution patterns
are more complex than captured there.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND REMAINING
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
We use the BP method to assess the time
series behavior of annual league attendance per
game for the North American major leagues.
The series are all nonstationary but stationary
with break points. This result should be of inter-
est to statistical analysts using level data. If they
wish to avoid spurious correlation outcomes,
they should exercise caution and use the station-
ary subsets of the attendance data we identify.
We also estimate the effects of game uncer-
tainty and play-off uncertainty, addressed di-
rectly by Rottenberg’s UOH, on aggregate
league attendance. Supporting evidence includes
only game uncertainty for the NBA and play-off
uncertainty for the NFL. Our findings of no sup-
port for the UOH in MLB is at odds with the pre-
vious findings, using a different PU measure, by
22. There were other things going on in the NFL as
well (the Oilers’ move from Houston to Tennessee, rule
changes, the entry of FOX into the broadcast market, and
improved on-screen TV viewing innovations). However, the
league had an earlier occurrence of a 42-day training camp
strike in 1974 that may have soured the fans for that season,
with some evidence for fan substitution between football and
baseball.
Lee and Fort (2008). In addition, we estimate the
effect of consecutive season uncertainty, which
Rottenberg did not address, on gate attendance
in each of these leagues. Increased consecutive
season uncertainty decreased attendance in the
NHL. The result might be due to a shortcoming
in our technique, as closely adjacent break points
would require reducing the trimming parameter
below that suggested by Bai and Perron (2006).
We hasten to point out that some results depend
on which measure of GU is used and that future
work should pay explicit attention to the investi-
gation of such measures. Almost certainly these
results will prove interesting in all further cross-
section/time series assessments of the role of
fan preferences in attendance demand. It would
also be interesting to see how these results relate
to television demand, and the natural extension
of GU research calls for further examination of
attendance at the game level.
It is important to note that we do not consider
sellouts for league-aggregate attendance, and
this could affect our findings with respect to
the effects of balance measures especially for
the NFL where sellouts are the most common.
More work is needed to evaluate the effects
of uncertainty on NFL attendance because of
this issue. Unfortunately, our breakpoint method
only allows for ordinary least squares regression
at this point in time. Further inspection at
the franchise level for some teams—especially
in the NFL—would certainly require further
consideration of sellouts in a limited dependent
variables framework.
Finally, despite the statistical significance
of some of our estimated outcome uncertainty
coefficients, the economic significance of out-
come uncertainty tends to be minimal. Marginal
alterations in outcome uncertainty can improve
league revenues only trivially in the NBA, NFL,
and NHL. It may be that the leagues in this
analysis have managed balance well enough that
it does not negatively affect fan interest in the
league.
Given that balance seldom matters at this
aggregate level, and when it does it does not
matter much, leads to our final research sugges-
tions. There is now ample evidence that out-
come uncertainty really just does not matter
(much) for North American pro sports in the
way Rottenberg suggested. However, Rotten-
berg’s is the typical logic espoused by team
owners, acting through their league, as justi-
fication for policy impositions like the draft,
revenue sharing, and salary caps. If not for the
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sake of balance, then why are the policies actu-
ally supported? Economists are well equipped
to examine the distributional consequences of
these policies between players and owners, and
some owners and others.
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